## Turkey PIC

### Impact – Russia/China

#### Turkey relations with NATO are in the tank – they’re courting Russia and China to maximize regional influence.

Michael **McCall**, and Tugrul **Keskin**, **22’** "Chapter 10 Sino–Turkish Relations in the New Era: From Political Conflict to Economic Cooperation", Rethinking China, the Middle East and Asia in a ‘Multiplex World’, Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004510005\_012

In a rapidly shifting global environment, China and Turkey have found many common points of interest. Despite the immense geographical and cultural distance between them, the bilateral relationship has emerged as a priority for both parties. In the modern era, as China seeks to expand its trade rela-tions and other mechanisms of soft power throughout the world, improving relations with Turkey presents opportunities that cannot be ignored. Turkey’s geostrategic placement, regional influence, and relatively strong economy by regional standards attract Chinese attention. Conversely, from the Turkish perspective, after years of strained relations with the EU and nato, China represents a fresh partner willing to cooperate without overbearing political demands. The multifaceted and complicated nature of the relationship makes it difficult to briefly characterise. Since October 2010 the two partners have defined their bilateral ties as a ‘strategic cooperative relationship’ (‘China, Turkey to establish strategic cooperative relationship’, 2010), but despite the fact that cooperation between the two does exist (though it is questionable as to whether it rises to the ‘strategic’ level), there remains contentious problems where national interests on both sides collide.In this relationship, the two sides are not equals. Contemporary China is a global juggernaut on the economic front and holds a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, whereas Turkey can make no such boasts in either field. Turkey is incapable of affecting the ‘rise’ of China. Whether or not Turkey desires a more assertive and powerful China is immaterial to reality on the ground. Therefore, from a purely pragmatic perspective, instead of resisting the changing tides of global power alongside its historic Western partners, Turkey is attempting to take advantage of the situation to capture a portion of China’s growth for itself wherever possible.Seeking to revive its position as a regional power, improving relations with China renews its historical image as a bridge between East and West. During the latter part of his tenure as foreign minister, Davutoğlu expressed an ambition to ‘develop a democracy with European Union standards, and a production style with Chinese standards’ (Bacık, 2011). Thus, within the vein of the ‘China Model’ or ‘Beijing Consensus’, Turkey views China not only as a partner, but as an example to be emulated in order to improve upon its own relative economic position. Beyond material interests, the ‘rise of China’ presents an ideational pull factor for Turkish attention. Particularly after the Eurozone crisis, the European development model and EU membership in general, has become far less attractive than close relations with China, to say nothing of the traumatic experience Turkey underwent in its own bid to join the EU.On the popular level, however, Turks generally maintain negative percep-tions of China, and a general improvement in bilateral relations will necessi-tate overcoming this gap. In a 2017 Pew poll, 54 per cent of Turks expressed an unfavourable view of China, a measure of disapproval that has not descended below 50 per cent since 2006 (Global Indicators Database, 2019). Relations are first and foremost driven by elites, and people- to- people ties remain lacklustre. Since the founding of the modern Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkey has primar-ily looked to the West as a cultural model to emulate. As a member of nato, Turkey has historically remained firmly in the Western camp regarding global geopolitics as well; Turkey and China militarily confronted each other directly once in the context of the Korean War. The development of Sino–Turkish rela-tions followed a similar timeline to that of the Sino– US thaw, with the opening of a Turkish embassy in Beijing in 1971. With the general decline of the US– Turkish partnership after disagreements surrounding the 2003 Iraq invasion, improving cooperation with China is a potential asset for Turkey to diversify its foreign relations so that it is no longer completely dependent upon its tra-ditional Western alliances. This is a part of Turkey’s new multi-dimensional and multi- track foreign policy, which intends to expand Turkey’s role in the world to that of a major regional player without subscribing to a zero-sum mentality in foreign policy. This foreign policy style is also apparent vis- à- vis Russia, where Turkey has sought out diplomatic cooperation despite Western resistance. Despite this effort to create an atmosphere of competition among different power blocs, Turkey’s alliance with the United States remains of paramount importance in its overall foreign policy outlook. It is unlikely that Turkey would prioritise its relationship with China over the interests of the United States regarding issues of dire importance.

### Aff AT Russia

#### Turkey can balance their relationships with NATO and Russia

Dries **Lesage**, **7-21**-2022, "The war in Ukraine and Turkey's hedging strategy between the West and Russia", Department of Political Science 2022, https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/8748234,/AndrewMurphy-AM

In the face of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Turkey takes a cautious position in line with its hedging strategy between the West and Russia, with the aim to maintain positive relations with both sides. Turkey has armed Ukraine and condemned Russia’s aggression. But it does not join Western sanctions against Russia. Due to traumatic historical experiences, Turkey does not want to be caught up in a conflict between major powers/blocs and prefers to retain its strategic autonomy. Recent crises of confidence between Turkey and the West reinforce this stance. Due to its geographical location and bad economic situation, Turkey has a direct interest in a rapid end to the war. This explains its active mediation role, where theoretically a more passive stance was possible. In addition, this high-profile mediation might also enhance Turkey’s international standing and help stem the decline of popularity of the incumbent leadership domestically.